Safety First Risk Preferences and Post-Harvest Grain Marketing A Context-rich Lab Experiment by Stamatina, Stamatina et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Cornhusker Economics Agricultural Economics Department 
3-4-2020 
Safety First Risk Preferences and Post-Harvest Grain Marketing A 
Context-rich Lab Experiment 
Stamatina Stamatina 
Simanti Banerjee 
Cory Walters 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker 
 Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, and the Economics Commons 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornhusker Economics by 
an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
agecon.unl.edu/cornhuskereconomics 
  Cornhusker Economics 
 
It is the policy of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln not to discriminate based upon age, race, 
ethnicity, color, national origin, gender-identity, sex, pregnancy, disability, sexual orientation, 
genetic information, veteran’s status, marital status, religion or political affiliation.  
March 4, 2020 
Safety First Risk Preferences and Post-Harvest Grain Marketing  
 A Context-rich Lab Experiment  
Improving our understanding of the influence of risk-
preferences on decision making represents an important ob-
jective for understanding behavior, designing policy and de-
cision making theory. A natural place this problem persists is 
in the marketing of grain (Kastens and Dhuyvetter, 1999). 
Grain marketing research has primarily focused on the use of 
different marketing techniques that result in lower price risk 
and, therefore, lower income risk (Musser, Patrick, Eckman, 
1996). However, the extent to which the theoretical findings 
from these studies are relevant to real-world applications is 
not clear (Brorsen and Irwin, 1996; Garcia and Leuthold, 
2004). While reducing income risk is desired, this approach 
overlooks the influence of producer risk preferences when 
marketing grain. In this article we evaluate the role of pro-
ducer risk preferences, specifically Safety-First (SF)risk prefer-
ences (Roy 1952) on grain marketing decision behavior with 
emphasis on post-harvest grain marketing.  
The idea behind SF is that individuals consider outcomes 
below a particular value as a disaster. Each individual would 
have his/her own disaster level. For farmers, a disaster could 
mean losing the farm or losing money in a particular crop 
year. Producers exhibiting SF risk preferences will make on-
farm decisions in a way to minimize the probability of 
achieving the disaster. For example, Fishburn (1997) found 
decision makers do associate risk with failure to meet a target 
return. Heady (1952) presented that farmers exhibit SF pref-
erences by allocating acres to particular crops in an attempt 
to minimize the probability of income falling below a disaster 
level defined as production costs. Given this context, we used 
a grain marketing simulation game to conduct a context-rich 
economic experiment with university student subjects to 
evaluate the role of SF risk preferences on grain marketing 
decision behavior. 
For our economic experiment and given our focus on SF risk 
preferences, we relied on the work by Levy and Levy (2009) 
to identify whether experimental subjects exhibit SF risk 
preferences. This information is then combined with post-
harvest grain marketing decisions made during the experi- 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  2-28-20 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  *  124.00  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  180.85  176.98  179.59 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  145.98  150.40  146.74 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  219.98  214.78  206.34 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  44.81  *  * 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59.64  77.21  64.05 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  134.24  NA  160.41 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  374.77  421.58  424.41 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4.03  4.37  4.10 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.52  3.68  3.64 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  8.06  8.27  8.36 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.45  5.91  5.74 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.13  3.32  3.18 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  175.00  *  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  105.00  107.50  * 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  92.50  95.00  95.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  144.50  149.00  141.58 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50.00  50.00  50.67 
 ⃰ No Market          
 ment within the simulated grain marketing interphases where 
subjects create contracts for spot or future grain delivery under 
four different grain price scenarios. 
Price Scenarios and Grain Marketing 
The four price treatments were selected from marketing years 
with specific price characteristics. In all treatments the spot 
price at harvest, i.e. the cash price for October, was above the 
production cost which was 3.8 Experimental Currency Units 
(ECU) per bushel. However, the spot price did not exceed 4.1 
ECUs per bushel. In Treatment 1 (hereafter “Stable” Price Se-
ries or T1), the expected price for each month was, on average, 
4.2 ECUs with a standard deviation of 0.16. The minimum net 
price displayed was 3.5 ECUs and the maximum available price 
in T1 was 4.1 ECUs.  In Treatment 2 (hereafter “Decreasing” 
Price Series or T2), prices followed a decreasing trend with the 
expected price per month, on average, being 3.8 ECUs per 
bushel with a standard deviation of 0.09. This parameterization 
led to a minimum net price of 2.5 ECUs per bushel and a maxi-
mum net price of 4 ECUs per bushel. The T2 series was con-
structed using actual price data from the 2002 marketing year 
and had no carry opportunities. Treatment 3 (hereafter 
“Erratic” Price Series or T3) had both increasing and decreasing 
trends changing multiple times throughout the year. The ex-
pected price per month was, on average, 4.7 ECUs with a stand-
ard deviation of 0.31, minimum net price of 3.2 ECUs and max-
imum net price of 5.4 ECUs. T3 was developed from infor-
mation on 2003 marketing year prices. Finally, in Treatment 4 
(hereafter “Increasing Price Series or T4), prices were increas-
ing from month to month. The expected price per month was, 
on average, 5.5 ECUs with a standard deviation of 0.62, mini-
mum net price of 3.9 ECUs, and maximum net price of 6.4 
ECUs. The T4 series was created using 2006 prices. This price 
series had the highest net price of all treatments and its lowest 
net price did not fall below production costs of 3.8 ECUs per 
bushel. In all other treatments the minimum net price didn’t 
cover the production cost.  
Experimental Design 
The experiment had three stages. The first stage involved elicita-
tion of the risk attitude of the experimental subjects following 
Levy and Levy (2009). In the second stage, subjects participated 
in an experiment involving selling a fixed endowment of the 
post-harvest crop during different months of four years to max-
imize their profits. Each year began in October as typically this 
is the month in which producers start selling their corn and 
soybean harvests (USDA Agricultural Handbook Number 628, 
1997) and ended in September of the next year. Decisions were 
made at the beginning of each month giving rise to 12 decision 
points for each year. Finally, in the third stage, participants took 
a non-paying survey which included questions about their gen-
eral understanding of probabilities and expected value, 
knowledge of farming and grain marketing and some demo-
graphic characters.   
Stage 2 of the experiment was implemented through the grain 
marketing interphase – Marketing in a New Era (MINE) 
(Kotsakou et al. 2018) in which subjects were aware that the 
item they were selling was an agricultural commodity; thus, 
considerably increasing the salience of our experimental find-
ings. 
The price scenario treatment was implemented in a within-
subjects design. At the beginning of a marketing year, partici-
pants were informed that (i) the prices they would face in 
different years were independent of each other, (ii) their per-
formance (measured by their profit) would not be influenced 
by the same in previous years and that (iii) all prices dis-
played would be net of storage cost of $0.07 ECUs per bushel. 
Subjects started the experiment with the same grain endow-
ment (117,500 bushels) and had the same storage cost (0.07 
ECUs per bushel). The total production cost was fixed at 
446,500 ECUs for all participants and under all treatments. 
The only marketing period price with a zero storage cost was 
the spot price in October, the first month of the marketing 
year.  
Decision making in a month involved subjects selling grain 
in 5,000 bushel increments. At every decision-making stage 
in a month, a table containing grain prices was displayed. The 
first price in the first row of the first column was the price 
offered in the spot market in October for immediate delivery. 
All other price information pertained to futures delivery i.e. 
the subject would receive the price they locked-in to sell their 
grain at minus the storage cost that is associated with storing 
the harvested grain until the month of sale. To facilitate deci-
sion making, subjects could sell grain in batches of 5000, 
10,000, 15,000, 20,000, or 25,000 bushels during a month. If 
multiple transactions were made during a month, infor-
mation pertaining to the details of each transaction 
(including the amount contracted and sold – if a spot con-
tract and contracted price and month of sale if a future con-
tract) was individually displayed along with information 
about total storage cost and total revenue before subjects pro-
ceeded to the next month. Subjects were informed that grain 
would not be carried over from one year to the next. Thus, if 
subjects had any grain remaining in September of the next 
year, this amount would be sold by the computer at the spot 
price for September.  
Before proceeding to the next marketing year, subjects were 
provided detailed information about all their decisions in the 
current year including total earnings and total storage cost 
incurred. On the left side of the screen, all sales and storage 
expenses were listed in chronological order starting from the 
most recent transaction (charge or sale). On the right side of 
the screen, earnings for that year were displayed. The results 
screen also indicated the number of years remaining until the 
conclusion of Stage 2.  
To facilitate subject understanding, in addition to instruction 
handouts and a presentation by the experimenter, there was a 
practice year with two months during which they had to 
make decisions. The price series used in the practice period 
was different from the price series used in the treatments.  
Subjects were paid on the basis of decisions made in Stages 1 
and 2. Subject’s total earnings were converted to real U.S. 
dollars at an exchange rate of $1 per 12,611 ECUs earned in 
the experiment. With a flat show-up fee of $7, on average 
participants earned $22 with a standard deviation of $6.82, a 
minimum of $7 and a maximum of $40. This study was con-
ducted with undergraduate and graduate students from the 
University of Nebraska in Lincoln as well as vocational stu- 
dents from the Nebraska College of Technical Agriculture 
(NCTA) in Curtis, Nebraska who receive specialized training in 
both commodity and animal agriculture. Subjects were randomly 
recruited from the University campus in Lincoln and a conven-
ience sample was recruited from the much smaller student body 
at NCTA to give rise to a data set of 131 students who participat-
ed in our experiments lasting for two hours. Data was collected 
between January and April of 2017. 
Empirical Estimation Strategy 
Our empirical approach is to identify the effects of SF risk prefer-
ences on bushels contracted by month. Elements like marketing 
knowledge, age, gender, and experiment knowledge could have 
contributed to the number of bushels sold. Therefore we estimate 
the following equation:  
 
 
where represents the percent of bushels sold (bushels sold/
bushels in storage) by subject i in year t; SF represents a vector 
taking the value 1 if producers displayed SF risk preference, and 
zero otherwise; Mixed SF represents a vector taking the value 1 if 
producers displayed a mix of SF risk preferences (i.e., they an-
swered some questions SF and others not), and zero otherwise 
(both these variables were computed on the basis of data from 
Stage 1 of the experiment); Treatment represents a matrix of 
price treatment effects where there is a dummy variable for each 
price treatment; Order represents a matrix order effect where 
there is a dummy variable for each order in which prices were 
presented to sub-
jects; Controls rep-
resents a matrix of 
and continuous variables for factors that may influence 
hedging.  These include Campus location (Lincoln or Cur-
tis), familiarity with grain marketing (four categories rang-
ing from not familiar to familiar); participant age (a continu-
ous variable); expected value (a question on whether the 
participant understood the expected value concept); clear 
instructions (whether instructions were clear); and first ex-
periment. are estimated parameters; and Ꜫit 
represents the error term. The constant represents someone 
who displayed no SF risk preferences, a particular treatment, 
a particular order, and one dummy variable from each cate-
gory in the control group. Equation 1 is estimated using two 
specifications. The first specification represents all bushels 
sold, regardless of contract type. The second specification 
represents bushels sold as cash contracts. 
Results 
Figures 1 and 2 describe the average number of bushels sold 
by month and for the spot market. The difference between 
bushels sold by month and spot market represents forward 
contracts (Note that positive returns to the carry did exist in 
one of the four price series. Meaning that it was financially 
beneficial to sell now for delivery in the future.) Visually, 
there is a very small difference between people on the basis 
of their risk types when looking at bushels sold, whereas for 
spot market sales, we see a substantially higher amount sold 
for those with SF risk preferences. 
Figure 1. Total Bushels sold by month  
Figure 2. Spot Market Bushels sold by month 
We estimate two models, each estimated by month containing a 
large number of variables. Thus, we present only partial marginal 
effects important to our hypothesis about the influence of SF 
preferences on grain marketing decisions. Table 1 displays the 
role of SF risk preferences for both models across the first six 
months of the storage period (October-March). The estimated 
relation between SF risk preferences and the number of bushels 
sold is insignificant for each month except for February (at 10% 
significance). For February we find a positive relation, indicating 
those with SF risk preferences sell 4% more than those without 
SF risk preferences. For the months not shown, no significant 
results were found between SF and bushels sold. Moving to the 
percent of bushels sold on the spot market, we find positive and 
significant results (at least at the 10% level of significance) for the 
first three months of the storage period. In October, SF risk pref-
erences sold 18% more than those without SF risk preferences. 
For November and December, the difference is 4% and 11%, 
respectively.  No significant results were found for the months 
not shown.  
Thus, our results suggest risk preferences, specifically SF risk 
preferences, do indeed influence the amount of grain sold. SF 
risk preferences appear to impact the amount of grain sold in 
two ways. First, those with SF risk preferences use spot market 
sales more than forward contracts. We see this result from lack 
of significant difference in SF estimate for total bushels sold, 
whereas for the spot market sales, we find evidence of significant 
differences in the percent of bushels sold per month. Second, 
those with SF risk preferences sell more in the months right after 
harvest as is evident in the positive and significant differences in 
spot market bushels sold in those months.  
Discussion 
In this project we investigated the role of SF risk preferences in 
post-harvest grain marketing decisions using the experimental  
economic methodology within a unique context-rich grain 
marketing simulation game. Our findings suggest that SF 
risk preferences impact the decision to sell grain and that 
this impact comes in two ways. First, those with SF risk pref-
erences appear to prefer cash contracts. Second, these indi-
viduals sell more grain in the months right after harvest. 
Both of these results appear to be reasonable given SF risk 
preferences whereby the person would behave in order to 
avert disaster. First, using cash contracts implies a cash 
transfer right away vs selling now for future delivery where 
there is the possibility of grain going out of condition and/or 
the elevator not being around when delivery occurs. Second, 
selling in the months immediately after harvest reduces net 
income risk as bushels are converted to dollars right away.  
The results have important implications for decision making. 
Our results suggest that there is a segment of the population 
following SF risk preferences who will focus on the use of 
cash contracts, despite financial opportunities resulting in 
higher net income. Our findings established that one should 
not expect everyone to take advantage of all commodity 
marketing ideas/concepts.  
The results of our study provide systematic evidence of con-
cepts about the importance of SF risk preferences to produc-
er decision making. However, we should exercise caution 
when generalizing these results given the student subject 
data base. External validity and generalizability of the results 
would require that we conduct these experiments with actual 
producers. Additionally, it is important to evaluate the de-
gree to which risk preferences impact marketing decisions in 
the pre-harvest setting under different grain price scenarios. 
These are the subject matter of current ongoing research.  
      Month 
Dependent 
Variable Parameter  October November December January February March 
Total 
Bushels Sold         
 Safety First  -0.14 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.04* 0.001 
      (0.16) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) 
Total Bushels 
Sold on 
Spot Market         
 Safety First  0.18** 0.04* 0.11*** 0.03 0.02 0.02 
      (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Note: Standard errors in the parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted by *, ** and ***  
for 0.01, 0.05,and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Table 1. Regression Results  
References 
Brorsen, B. W., & Irwin, S. H. (1996). Improving the relevance of 
research on price forecasting and marketing strategies. Agri-
cultural and Resource Economics Review, 25(1), 68-7 
Garcia, P., & Leuthold, R. M. (2004). A selected review of agricul-
tural commodity futures and options markets. European 
Review of Agricultural Economics, 31(3), 235-272. 
Fishburn, P.C., 1997. “Mean-risk analysis with risk associated 
with below target returns,” Journal of The American Econom-
ic Review, 67, pp.116-126. 
Heady, E.O., 1952. “Diversification in resource allocation and 
minimization of income variability.” Journal of Farm Eco-
nomics, 34(4), pp.482-496. 
Kastens, T. L., & Dhuyvetter, K. C. (1999). Post-harvest grain 
storing and hedging with efficient futures. Journal of Agricul-
tural and Resource Economics, 482-505. 
Levy, H., & Levy, M. (2009). The safety first expected utility mod-
el: Experimental evidence and economic implications. Jour-
nal of Banking & Finance, 33(8), 1494-1506. 
Musser, W. N., Patrick, G. F., & Eckman, D. T. (1996). Risk and 
grain marketing behavior of large-scale farmers. Review of 
Agricultural Economics, 65-77. 
Roy, A. D. (1952). Safety first and the holding of as-
sets. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 431-
449 
USDA, 1997. “Usual planting and harvesting dates for US field 
crops.” Agricultural Handbook, 628. Available at: https://
downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/
vm40xr56k/9p290c614/kw52jb531/planting-12-05-1997.pdf  
Stamatina Kotsakou 
PhD Student 
University of California, Davis 
skotsakou@ucdavis.edu  
 
Simanti Banerjee 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
simanti.banerjee@unl.edu  
 
Cory Walters 
Ag Economics Department 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
402-472-0366 
cwalters7@unl.edu 
